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There  is  a  serious  and  far-reaching  debate  about  U.S.  foreign
policy.  A  major  theme  in  this  discussion  is  the  criticism  that  the
United  States  is  overcommitted  in too  many  parts of the world.  It is
charged  that  we  have  attempted  to  enforce  a  Pax  Americana  or
that  we have  an "arrogance  of power."  This process  of re-examina-
tion  of U.S.  foreign  policy  in  the  1960's  has been focused  on  and  is
inevitably  related  to  the tragic  war  in  Vietnam.  The  Vietnam  con-
flict  and  American  involvement  in  it  raises  nearly  every  question
about  goals  of U.S.  policy  in  Asia, the  obstacles  to the  achievement
of those  goals,  and  the  instruments  of foreign  policy  within  which
we are forced  to work.
Our policy  in Southeast Asia should  be  seen  in  the broader  con-
text  of  the  current  debate  about  America's  role  in  foreign  affairs.
The  issues  of Vietnam  are more  than  whether  to stop  the bombing
of the  North  or whether  to mine  Haiphong harbor.  Rather the  issue
raised  in Vietnam  is, how  far are  we willing  to  go and  at what  costs
to  suppress  Communist  associated  revolutionary  change  in the  non-
Western  world?  A closely  related issue is,  are  the ideological,  organ-
izational,  military,  and  economic  tools  at  our  command  sufficient
for  the task  which  we have set for ourselves?
Since  World  War  II,  besides  furthering  our  national  security,
the  United  States  has  been  performing,  more  or  less  consciously,
the  role  of guardian  of a  particular  set  of values  about  the  nature
of world  order  and  the  relationships  between  states.  This  order  in-
cludes  both  the  recognition  of a  principal  fact  and  the  elaboration
of a hope.  The principal  fact which  we  recognize  is  that the present
world  order  is  based  on  the  persistence  of the  nation-state  as  the
basic  unit  of  political  organization.  Unlike  Communist  ideology,
our world view  accepts  the durability  of the nation-state  as the basic
unit of political  organization.  A major  goal  of U.S.  policy  is to  sup-
port  the  independence  and  territorial  integrity  of nation-states.  The
hope which  we hold  out is that the emergent  pattern  of relationships
between  nation-states  will  be  governed  by  a growing  body  of world
law,  in  which  ultimately  even  the  most  intense  political  conflicts,
involving  territory  and  who  shall  control  it,  are  resolved  by  peace-
ful means.
3These  two  principles,  therefore,  are  important  over-all  guide-
lines of U.S. policy  which have not varied much since  our emergence
as  a  great  power.  What  has  changed  is  the  world  in  which  these
principles  must  be  given  practical  effect.  We  recognize,  of course,
that  we  live  in  a  world  where  change  is  rapid  and  fraught  with
the  possibility  of  violence.  Everywhere,  political  questions  funnel
quickly  into armed conflicts.  A  cursory look  at the last several years
will  count  armed  attempts  at  territorial  change,  sometimes  success-
ful,  in the Middle  East,  with  the Arab-Israeli conflict;  in South Asia
with the Sino-Indian  and Indo-Pakistan conflicts;  and in innumerable
small-scale  wars  in  Africa.  The  United  States has  not  engaged  in  a
direct  military  sense  in  the  majority  of  these  conflicts.  While  we
have  rejected  the  role  of policeman  in  this  world  order,  imperson-
ally  carrying  out  the  logical  implications  of  a  commitment  to  up-
hold  world  law,  we  have  helped  to  build  international  cooperation
through  the  sponsorship  of  regional  and  international  conferences,
by  our  participation  in international  organizations,  and by  our con-
tributions  to  various  peace-keeping  efforts  of  the  United  Nations.
We  try  to  encourage  the  recognition  by  all  states  of  the  need  to
carry on  international  relations  in a civilized  manner.
On  the hard  question  of  directly  involving  our  strength  in  one
side or the other  of an  armed conflict  involving  the control of people
and  territory,  the  United  States  has  moved  with  great  caution.  We
weigh  the  consequences  of a  commitment  in one  area  on  our  com-
mitments  in  other  parts  of the  world.  We  ask whether  our  involve-
ment  can  bring about a desirable  conclusion  to  the conflict.  Finally,
we  examine  the  implications  of involvement  or  noninvolvement  on
the long-range  course  of American  interests.
We  must  assume  that  all  of these  questions  were  asked  by  our
policy  makers  at  the various  turning  points  in our  Southeast  Asian
involvement.  We  must  assume  that  our  policy  makers  in  the  four
administrations  which  have  made  and  reaffirmed  so  pointedly  our
commitment  to  the  defeat  of  the  Coummunist  goal  of  unification
of  Vietnam  under  Hanoi's  auspices,  have  agonized  over  the  con-
sequences  of their  action.  What  factor has  been  added  to the  Viet-
namese  situation  which  has  compelled  the  United  States  at  every
turning point  to increase  the involvement  of the United States?
Assistant  Secretary  of  State  William  Bundy  describes  the  U.S.
position  during  the  waning  days  of  the  French  Indochina  war  as
one  of supporting  the  French  fight  against  the  Viet  Minh  while  at
the  same  time  urging  that  the  French  give  national  independence
4to  all  of  Indochina.1 After  1950  the  United  States  perceived  the
Communist  world  as  a  near  monolith.  Our  major  concern  at  the
close  of the French  engagement  was whether  to  attempt to continue
to work through  the French  as the bulwark in Southeast Asia against
the  expected  advances  of Communist  influence,  or  to let the French
withdraw  and  assume the "bulwark"  role  ourselves.
United  States'  direct  involvement  began  in  the  period  of  the
Geneva  convention  of  1954.  We  did  not  participate  directly  in  the
Geneva  meeting,  according  to  Assistant  Secretary  Bundy,  because
our  policy  makers  "did not  wish  to associate  themselves  in  any  way
with  a  loss  of  territory  to  Communist  control."  At  this  point  we
made  clear  a third  guiding  principle  of American  foreign  policy  in
the postwar period-that we would  do everything possible to prevent
the  acquisition  of any  more  territorial  control  by  Communist  gov-
ernments.  It  did  not  matter  whether  these  territories  were  divided
nations  as  in Korea,  Germany,  and Vietnam,  or independent  entities
on the  border  of a  Communist  state,  such  as  Greece  or Iran.  It  was
to  this  end  that  we  pressured  the  French  into  installing  Ngo  Dinh
Diem  as  Prime Minister  of South Vietnam.
By  1954  the  United  States  had  committed  itself  to  preserving
the  independence  of  non-Communist  states  in  Southeast  Asia.
Among these states  was  South Vietnam.
The  Geneva  accords  clearly  refrain  from  referring  to  either  of
the  divided halves  of Vietnam  as  states. Nevertheless  a set of author-
ities  did  exist  in  the  North  and  likewise  through  French  and  U.S.
efforts  in  the  South.  Certainly  it  was  the  intent  of the conferees  to
provide  some  mechanism  for  the  unification  of  the  two  units.
Political  arrangements  concerning  who  would  control  what  terri-
tories were to be  left to those directly  engaged.
Since  this  arrangement  clearly  raised  the threat  of a Communist
North  Vietnamese  takeover,  the United  States  did not  leave  matters
to chance.  We were  aware  that in  1954,  and  presumably for  at least
a year  or so  after  that,  the North  would  win  in  any  election,  North
or  South.  Ho  Chi  Minh  was  the  single  most  popular  figure  in  the
country.  We  took  it  upon  ourselves  to  create  a  non-Communist
alternative  to Ho Chi Minh  in the figure  of Ngo  Dinh Diem.
In  this  act  lies  ambiguity  of  our  position.  By  supporting  non-
Communist  nationalism  under  Diem,  were  we  saying  that  here  is
a  national,  that is,  all-Vietnamese  alternative  to  Ho  Chi  Minh?  To
1  This discussion  is based on a speech given before the National Student Association,
University  of Maryland,  College Park,  Maryland,  August  15,  1967.
5be  sure,  we  had  always  said  that  we  would  be  willing  to  see  the
unification  of North  and  South  through  free  elections  under United
Nations  auspices.  Thus  it  appears  from  this  that  the  United  States
had  no  desire  to  create  a  new  "South  Vietnamese  nationalism."  On
the  other hand,  we  did  extend  the SEATO  guarantee to  South  Viet-
nam  as  an  independent  nation-state.  Again  in  the words of Assistant
Secretary  Bundy,  in  1954  "a  new  national  entity  came  into  being
in  South  Vietnam."  This  new  nation  was  one  of the  "valid  national
entities"  of Southeast  Asia that we  were  committed  to defend.  Thus
it  seems  clear  from  Mr.  Bundy's  remarks  and  from  the  action  of
the  United  States  at  that  time  and  at  present,  that we  have  tried  to
create  a non-Communist  nation  in South  Vietnam which  was  nation-
ally  distinct  from  its  Communist  enemy,  North  Vietnam.  Not  only
did  we  create  it,  but  "'we  moved  into  a  major  supporting  role  and
undertook  a  major  treaty  commitment  involving  South  Vietnam."
What  about  our  support  for  a reunified  Vietnam?  We  stipulated
and  the  Geneva  accords  stressed  that  the  election  or  plebiscite,
whichever  interpretation  prevails,  should  be  free.  Mr.  Bundy  and
other  spokesmen  for  our  policy  have  said  that  a  free  election  was
impossible  in  North Vietnam  under  Communist  aegis.  Any proposal
for such  an  election  by the South  was  not forthcoming  so  we cannot
know.  We  do  know  that  whether  it  was  for  reasons  of pride  or  be-
cause Diem  doubted his own political  base in the South  as a Northern
Catholic,  that  the  elections  proposed  by  the  Geneva  accords  were
never  held.
Whatever  the case,  by  1961  and  the  advent  of the  Kennedy  ad-
ministration,  in  Bundy's  words,  we  were  "deeply  engaged  in  South-
east  Asia  and  specifically  in  the  preservation  of  the  independence
of  South  Vietnam."  Since  we  have  repeatedly  expressed  that
reunification  can  come  only  through  free  elections,  and  since  we
are  firmly  convinced  that  free  elections  cannot  be  held  under  a
Communist regime,  and since we have assured the North Vietnamese
that  we  have  no  intention  of  destroying  the  Communist  govern-
ment  there,  we  must  conclude  that  we  are  committed  to  existence
of a  separate  South  Vietnam  as  an  independent  nation-state.  Thus
we have  a more or less permanent  division of what  was  once a single
nationalist  movement,  led  and  probably  fully  controlled  by  the
Communists  under  Ho  Chi  Minh.  This  division  has  been  given
legal  status  by  virtue  of  the  United  States  defining  South  Vietnam
as  a  state, and  by  our political judgment  that it is  a "viable  political
entity."
We  have  undertaken  a task  in  the creation  of South Vietnam  as
6a non-Communist  state based on  a genuine  sense of national identity
with the government  in Saigon,  which  we cannot  fulfill.  By  our own
admission,  nationalism  was  defunct  in  all  Vietnam  except  for  that
controlled  by  the  Viet  Minh.  By  our  own  admission the  policies  of
Diem,  a  Northerner  and  a  Catholic,  were  at  best ineffective  and  at
worst  counterproductive.  By  our own  count  the Viet Cong, however
much  they  had  been  trained  in  the  North,  were  Southerners  and
did  control  the  majority  of the population  throughout  much  of the
Diem  regime.  We contributed  to the overthrow  of Diem because  we
believed  that he  was  destroying  any chance  for  a South  Vietnamese
nationalism  to  emerge.  We  have  further  stated  that from  that  time
until  the  Thieu-Ky  regime  of  1965,  South  Vietnam  "wallowed  in
political  confusion."
We had asserted  the existence  of a Vietnamese  nationalism which
could effectively  counter  that of the Communists.  We placed our bet
on  a Northern  Catholic  in  a  Buddhist  country.  We  were  forced  by
circumstances  to  hope  that  we  could  at  least  create  a  South  Viet-
namese  nationalism,  surely  a new  phenomenon,  which  is  not shared
today by political  leaders  in  the South,  many  of whom  still consider
themselves  Northerners.  It  is  time  to  admit  that  the  history  of the
last thirteen years has told  us one story, that non-Communist nation-
alism  is  not  a  strong  commodity  in Vietnam  and  that  it  cannot  be
manufactured  by American  policies.  This  is  especially  true  when  we
realize  that  anti-Communist  nationalist  feeling  is  strongest  among
those persons  who  fled from the  North  at the time of partition,  and
that the dominance of these refugees  in the ruling places  of the Saigon
government,  both  under Diem and  under Ky,  is  a source of constant
friction and hostility  on the part of the Buddhist Southerners.
An  objective  reading  of our  policy  leads  to  the  conclusion  that
in the interest of our over-all policy  of containing Communist  expan-
sion,  or,  put  another  way,  preventing  the  emergence  of Communist
regimes,  we  have  acted  consistently  to  first  create  and  then  sustain
through American  assistance,  military  training,  and now actual com-
mitment  of  U.S.  troops  a  separate  South  Vietnamese  nation-state.
We  have  made  South  Vietnam  an  ally in fact  through  the  extension
of  the  SEATO  protocols.  With  these  policies  we  have  created  a
situation  where,  by definition,  any political  involvement  in the South
by North  Vietnam  is  both  subversion  and  aggression  against  a sov-
ereign state.
We  state  that  we  have  offered  to  negotiate  without  conditions
with  North  Vietnam.  Yet  for  the  North  Vietnamese  to  negotiate
without  the active  and  equal  status of the  National Liberation  Front
is  to  accept  the  U.S.  definition  of the  war.  The  negotiations  would
7be  about the withdrawal  of aggressive forces  and subversive influence
from  South  Vietnam.  For  the  North  Vietnamese,  it  would  be  an
admission  that the  U.S.  definition  was correct.
We  are  emphatically  committed  to  protecting  the separate  exis-
tence  of  South  Vietnam.  From  the  Northern  point  of  view,  it  is
precisely  the  issue  of whether  South  Vietnam  is  a  separate  national
political  entity  that  the  war  is  all  about.  For them  to  negotiate  on
the  grounds  that  South  Vietnam  is  a  viable  nation-state  which  the
United  States  is  pledged  to protect  would  be  to  admit  defeat  at  the
outset.  We  are,  therefore,  imposing  very  real  conditions  on  negotia-
tions.
In  the world  view  of the administration,  the  success of Commu-
nism  in  South  Vietnam  would  be  a  major  boost to Communist  sub-
version  in  other  parts  of Asia.  Thus  the  line  is  drawn.  Either  we
persist  in  South  Vietnam  by  defeating  the Viet  Cong  and  the  North
Vietnamese,  or  we  withdraw  from  the  field  of  battle,  go  back  on
our  commitments,  and  in  all  likelihood  open  the  doors  to  Chinese
Communist dominance of Southeast Asia. The forces of Communism
everywhere  would  be  encouraged,  and  all  the enemies  of the  United
States  would  move  to quickly  make political propaganda  out of our
defeat.  Is  there  an  alternative  to  our  present  policy  in  Southeast
Asia?  In the view  of the  administration,  there  is  not.
What  will  we  have  gained  from  a  defeat  of  the  Viet  Cong  and
Hanoi  in  Vietnam?  We  have expressed  no desire  for bases  in  South-
east  Asia.  Presumably  we  would  evacuate  our major  troop  strength
in  South  Vietnam  and  Thailand.  Presumably  we would  leave behind
in  South  Vietnam  a  government  and  military  structure  reasonably
able  to take care  of itself.  Frankly, if the war were to  end in the next
six  months,  it  is  doubtful  if the  United  States  could  withdraw  with
much  confidence that the present government  would survive.  In short,
"victory"  in South  Vietnam  means:
1. Forcing the Viet Cong  and Hanoi to withdraw from the armed
conflict.
2.  Eradicating  the political  structure  of the National  Liberation
Front,  either  by  imprisonment,  reindoctrination,  or  exile  of
of its  leadership.
3.  Creating  a national  government  in  South  Vietnam  which  re-
flects the basic social and  cultural make-up  of South  Vietnam.
4.  Creating  the  beginnings  of  a  viable  economy,  sufficient  to
sustain and  improve the standards  of living of the South  Viet-
namese.
85.  Creating  an  internal  security  force  sufficiently  strong to  pre-
vent  the  re-emergence  of  sustained  guerilla  activity  in  the
South.
Only  by  achieving  these  objectives  could  the  United  States
afford  to withdraw  militarily  from  Vietnam  in terms  of the present
policy.
I  am  not convinced  that  we  have  the  power  or  political  deter-
mination  to pursue  a  long  period  of quasi-colonial  tutelage  of  the
South  Vietnamese,  in  the  hope  that  in  the  distant  future  they  can
take  care  of  their  own  internal  problems  with  only  technical  and
capital  assistance  from  the United States.
Assuming for  the  moment  that  we  are willing  to stay  for  a long
period,  first  to  crush  the  insurgency  militarily,  then  to  rebuild  and
stabilize  the political  situation,  what  would be  our position  in  other
parts of Asia?  By  defeating Hanoi  in Vietnam,  would  we necessarily
have solved  the problem  of political  chaos  and revolutionary  change
in  other  parts  of Asia?  Does  it  follow  that  Laos  would  be  relieved
of  its  internal  difficulties  with  the  Pathet  Lao?  Does  it  follow  that
there  would  be  no  more  Communist  activity  in  the  northeast  of
Thailand?  We  have  backed  ourselves  into  the  position  where  we
must believe that a solution in Vietnam  is  a solution for all of South-
east  Asia.  Yet it  seems that  we  will  not  have solved  the internal  po-
litical  and  economic  conditions  which  make  Communism  a  viable
alternative  in  Southeast  Asia.  And  we  will  not  have  eliminated  the
natural  tendency  of Communist  China  to  become  involved  in  the
affairs of the  states  on its borders.
The  consequences  of  our  present  policy  may  well  be  just  the
contrary  of what  we  hope  to  achieve.  Instead  of a  China  that  has
somehow  learned  a  lesson  in  South  Vietnam,  we  have  had  a  rapid
increase  in  Chinese  disruptive  activity,  as  pointed  out in  Malaysia,
Thailand,  Burma,  and  Cambodia.  I  do not see the logic of a position
which  says  that  by  defeating  Hanoi  we  have  somehow  reduced
Peking's  capacity  to  be engaged  in  subversive  activity in  other  parts
of Asia.
In  the  long  run  it is  futile  to  persist  in  a  policy  which  attempts
to  seal  off the states  on  the southern  border  of China from  Chinese
influence.  Where  there  is  nationalism  and  a  fairly  well-established
political  elite,  as  in  Thailand,  the  United  States  can  and  should
assist  in  the  development  of  that  nation.  Certainly  Thailand,  the
Philippines,  Indonesia,  and  perhaps  Malaysia  would  be  targets  for
increased  American  capital,  technical,  and  internal  security  assist-
9ance.  Edwin  O.  Reischauer  suggests  that the strategy  of shifting  the
basis of  support  to  Thailand  would  only  spread  American  military
commitments  "into  areas  where  the  Vietnam  war  had just  shown
that  our  type  of  military  power  was  relatively  ineffective." 2 This
is  not  necessarily  the  case.  It  is  not  ineffective  U.S.  military  power
which  is  contributing  to  our  inability  to  defeat  the Communists.  It
is  our  inability  to  find  the key  to a viable  political organization  and
ideology  which  could  sustain  a  Saigon  government.  Our  military
power  can  be very  effective  when  we  are acting  in  a supporting  role
of  a government  which  has its  roots in the political  tradition of most
of  the  people  and  which  demonstrates  its  capability  to  carry  the
main  burden  of responsibility  for  its  own  security.  Neither  of these
factors  have  existed  to  any  significant  degree  in  South  Vietnam.
What  must  any  alternative  policy  in  Southeast  Asia  seek  to achieve
if  it  is  to  be  preferred  to  the  present  position?  An  alternative  U.S.
policy  would have  the following  objectives:
First,  it  must  achieve  a  reduction  in  the  U.S.  military  commit-
ment  to  South  Vietnam  with  the  simultaneous  goal  of seeking  the
reunification  of North  and  South.  We  should  seek  a  withdrawal  of
North  Vietnamese  regulars  coincidental  with  a  phased  withdrawal
of the U.S.  military.  This  should  be  initiated  by  a  unilateral halting
of  the  air  war  in  the  North.  Reunification  and  the  process  of  re-
construction  could  be  assisted  through  offers  of'U.S.  capital  assist-
ance,  ostensibly  committed  to  the  South  but  available  throughout
Vietnam.  We  should  make  it  clear  that  we  will  not  oppose  unifica-
tion  by  any  formula  worked  out  by  the  Vietnamese  themselves.
Second,  it must find  some  way  of permitting  Communist  China
to  have  greater  influence  in  Southeast  Asia.  We  cannot  expect  this
to be  friendly  or  constructive  influence.  But  we can  hope  to engage
China in  a more rational  dialogue than the present  situation  permits.
I  do  not  believe  China  will  join  the  "community  of nations"  as  we
wish  unless  she  has  a  greater  say  in  Southeast  Asia  than  we  are
presently  willing  to accept.
Third,  it must  find some  way  of permitting  the United  States to
continue  to have  a role  in  Southeast  Asia,  although  not a  dominant
one.  We  have  already  moved  to  encourage  regional  cooperation  in
the Mekong River development  scheme  and numerous other projects.
If we  indicate  that  we  are  prepared  to  do  more,  once  the  Vietnam
problem  is  out  of the way,  I  see  no  reason  why  this  should not  be
acceptable  and desirable  to the nations of the  area.
2Edwin  O.  Reischauer,  "Vietnam:  What  Are  Our  Choices?"  in  Look,  Septem-
ber  19,  1967.
10Fourth,  the  United  States  should  reaffirm  its  military  commit-
ments  to the  SEATO signatories  against  overt  attack  from China  or
Vietnam.  We  should  also  make  available  to  them  internal  security
assistance  short  of  direct  intervention  where  there  clearly  exists  a
threat that cannot  be handled  by the country's own  resources.
Such  a  policy,  pursued  carefully  and  gradually,  could  result  in
a  situation  where  the  small  states  of  Southeast  Asia  would  be  per-
mitted  to reduce  the  reliance  on  their  own  security  solely  on  their
good relations  with the United  States. It might permit them gradually
to  enlarge  their  contacts  with  China,  always  keeping  the  United
States  in  the  equation  as  a  counterweight  to  Chinese  influence.  It
would  be  a  policy  which  would  reduce  the  immediate  American
military  involvement  in  Southeast  Asia,  and  substantially  reduce
the  enormous  financial  cost  of the present  war.  Finally,  it  would  be
a  policy  which  might  restore  the  support  of many  domestic  inter-
nationalists  in  the  United  States  to  a  policy  of  reasonable  U.S.  in-
volvement  in  Asian  affairs.
What  are  the  costs  of withdrawal,  however  gradual and  however
papered  over with other activity?  We should not minimize the psycho-
logical  effect  it might have on our Asian  allies.  Certainly they would
re-evaluate  their  relationship  with  the  United  States  and  China.  It
does  not  follow,  however,  that this policy  would result  in  a massive
diplomatic  shift  of Thailand, the  Philippines,  or  Indonesia to  a pro-
Chinese  stance.  After  all,  these  countries would  still have  an interest
in  a  U.S.  presence  in  Asia.  They  would  continue  to  have  a  vital
interest  in  their  own  political  independence.  So  long  as  the  United
States  is  a global  power,  it will  figure in  the foreign  policies  of these
states.  I  do  not  think  a  withdrawal  from  Vietnam  would  mean  the
rapid  rise of Communist insurgency  in other parts  of the world.  The
success  or  failure  of a Communist  guerilla  movement  in  Venezuela,
for  example,  depends  on  factors  internal  to  the  hemisphere  and
Venezuela.
Perhaps  the  most  telling  argument  against  withdrawal  from
Vietnam  short  of victory  rests  on  the  fact  that  we  would  be  going
back  on our commitments.  As Assistant  Secretary  Bundy points  out,
"When  great  powers  commit  themselves-by  treaty  and  by  a  total
course  of  conduct  extending  over  many  years-an  element  of  re-
liance  comes  into  being, both  within  the area and  within  other areas
in  which  commitments  have  also  been  undertaken."  This  no  doubt
is  true.  Yet  it  seems  that  the  United  States,  as  a  great  power,  has
a  variety  of commitments  both  foreign  and  domestic.  To  the extent
that  the  Vietnam  conflict  makes  it  politically  impossible  to  meet
some  pressing  commitments  to our own  domestic  social  and political
well-being,  it  is  time  that  we  examine  our  priorities.  Furthermore,
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support for  an internationalist  position by  any  administration.
What,  then,  are our  alternatives  in Southeast Asia?
We  may  proceed  with  our  present  course,  gradually  increasing
the  application  of  military  pressure  on  Hanoi  on  the  assumption
that China will not intervene, and that Hanoi cannot hold out forever.
As  I  have  tried to  suggest,  I  see  this as  a long-term  commitment  of
very  high  cost  to  the United  States.  With  military  victory  there  still
would  be  no  guarantee  that  political  stability  would  be  achieved  in
South  Vietnam  and  that the whole  affair would  not begin  again.
The  other  reasonable  alternative  is  to  elaborately  and  carefully
withdraw  from Vietnam,  cushioning  the psychic shock of withdrawal
with  every  possible  diplomatic  effort.  In  connection  with withdrawal
we should  step  up our  efforts  to encourage China  to play  a role as  a
legitimate  power  in  Southeast Asia.  They  may  reject  this.  The mod-
eration  of the  present regime  will not happen overnight.  Nevertheless
we  will  have  held  the  door open  to  a  more  responsible  role  than  is
presently  the  case.  I  believe  it is  worth the risk.
It  has  been  asked,  why  are  we  in  Asia?  We  can  no  longer  ask
the  question.  It  may  have  been  relevant  when  the  United  States
opened  Japan  to  Western  influence.  It  may  have  been  less  than
rhetorical  prior to  World  War  II.  The United  States has  considered
itself  a Pacific  power  since  at  least  that  time  and  I  doubt  if a  com-
plete  withdrawal  from  this  position  is  possible  or  desirable.  Having
said  that,  however,  I  can  but  feel  that through  our quite  honorable
efforts  to  protect  the  freedom  of small  states  in  Southeast  Asia,  we
have  gradually  come  to  perceive  ourselves  as  the  dominant  power
in  Asia.  However  much  we  may  dislike  the  Communist  Chinese,  it
is  futile  for  the  United  States  to  attempt  to  prevent  China  from
having  a major role in the  affairs  of that region.  A policy  of contain-
ment,  pursued  as  it  is  in  Vietnam,  seems  destined  to  prevent  the
hoped  for  moderation  of  Chinese  attitudes  and  policies.  I  believe
that the United States has a real opportunity to do more than contain
China.  We  have  an  opportunity  to  begin  to  bring  China  into  the
"community  of  nations."  We  cannot  do  it  while  bombing  within
ten  miles of the  China border.
I  must  close  with  the  war  in  Vietnam.  Our  persistence  in  this
effort  works  against  the  emergence  of  a  truely  effective  U.S.  role
in Southeast  Asia.  I have  suggested  that a withdrawal  from Vietnam
would  not be  the disaster our present  leadership  portrays,  but would
open  a  new  and  more  realistic  era  of  U.S.  involvement  in  Asian
affairs.
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